tion Act of 1996. It also came to include supplement 1 executive plans to ensure the continued and expanded public funding of social and charitable serviees in the United Sttes by religious organizations.
The charitable choice provision, passed by a Republican House and Senate was "entirely ignored by Federal administrators ''4 during the Clinton administration, aceording to members of the Bush White House staff. Consequently, it became a matter that required and would receive major attention by the new administration. Title I of the provision dealt with public assistance and called on government to provide the "most effective and effieient manner" of assistanee to individuals and families in need. It prohibited discfimination solely on the basis of religion in the funding of organizations that provide social and ehafitable services. It allowed religious organizations to apply fbr public monles, to adrninister them, and to distribute government aid without the entanglement that religious groups feared would impair their spiritual characters or missions. The law also recognized the ¡ of individuals and families in need to choose to receive social and/or charitable services from religious organizations rather than government or secular ageneies.
In return, religious organizations were prohibited from using government funds to aid or endorse any religion. All public monies had to be used for social welfare purposes. The legislation was crafted so as to allow religious organizations to retain their autonomy, that is, to be free ffom government interferenee in the perfbrmanee of their soeial/charitable missions. And, with regard to employment, religious organizations were allowed to require their workers to adhere to the religious practiees of their organizations, but fbrbidden to diseriminate in hiring on the basis of tate, color, sex, national origin, visual impairment, disabilities, or age. They would retain their tax-exempt status, and would be required to obey all the aforementioned regulations with regard to grants, eontracts, and other indireet h)rms of" disbursement, sueh as vouchers and cm~ificates.
Title II of the charitable ehoiee provision encouraged "Individual Development Accounts." These •llowed families and individuals with limited means to aceumulate assets. They eould be used for personal development, such as first time home bu)dng, edueation, and business investments. The govemment would match such s vings up to a eertain point in order to stabilize families and build communities.
Neglected by federal administrators, as mentioned previously, charitable choice became a focus of the platform of Republican candidate versity of Missouri, who was heax41y involved in the development of charitable choiee legislation. 4. Ibid.
George W. Bush in the 2000 presidential campaign. He promoted it as part of his ideology known as "compassionate eonservatism," and immediately af}er his election, sought to turn bis commitment to both compassion and conservatism into a viable public policy. To do this, Bush advoeated a broader and stronger public acceptance of charitable choice and other faith-based initiatives. Indeed, he soon began to endorse a public policy designed to develop a closer wor]dng relationship beta~,een the government and religious institutions, as well asa partnership to "ensure greater cooperation between the government and the private sector. ''5 In December, even before his inauguration, President-elect Bush met with about thirty ministers and other religious leaders to discuss ways to expand the roles of religious and charitable organizations in federal welfare programs. 6 He attempted to begin a dialogue with them, 7 i. e., a conversation on "how best to help faith-based programs change people's lives," and on "how best government can encourage ... faith-based programs ... [to] perfbrm their commonplaee miracles of renewal. ''s However, his motives were immediately suspect, with some in the media claiming that Bush was simply attempting to reach out to African-Americans through their clergy, since so few blacks had voted for him. ~ tlev. Jesse Jackson, one of several prominent black leaders who had not been invited to the meeting, contended that "I know hhe subplot: This is an attempt to play one group against the other."~~ Undaunted by the early criticism of the media toward his faithbased initiative, the fledgling president issued two significant executive orders within weeks of taking office. The first created the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, and the second set up similar offices in d-,e Departments of Justice, Housing and Urban Development, tlealth and Human Services, Labor, and Education. Under the leadership of John Dilulio, a Democrat and political scien-5. George W. Bush, "On the Creation of a White lIouse Office for Faith Based and Communits, Groups," Netv York "Fi~~ws, 30 January "2001, Al8. 6. Itichard A. Oppel, Jr. and Gustar Niebuhr, "Bush Meeting Focuses on Bole of Religion," The Netv York Tbrws, "21 December "2000, A37. 7. Invitees ineluded the Reverend Eugene Rivers of the Azusa Christian Communit).' in Boston, ttev. Jira Wallis of Call to l~enewal, and Bishop Joseph A. Fiorenza of Houston, who was also the president of National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Others included ttev. C. Welton Caddy, executive director of the Interfaith Allianee, Bev. Floyd Flake, former congressman and pastor of the Allen AME Church in Queens, New York, Itev. l/obert Sirico, president of the Acton lnstitute, and sever•l loeal, senior ministers from churches in Texas. 8. Dana Milbank and IIamil I~. Harris, "Bush, Beligious Leaders Meet," The Washington Post, 21. December 2000, A6. 9. Oppel and Niebuhr, "Bush Meeting." 10. Ibid. tist from the University of Pennsylvania, the new chief executive made ir clear that a Bush/Dilulio vision of public support for faith-based charitable and social efforts would become a priority at the highest levels of the federal government.
In reality, Bush's actions signaled more than a re-prioritizing of public concerns and more than the estab]ishment of a new governmental infrastructure for the funding and delivery of charitable and social services in the United States. Indeed, his actions reflected a strategic change in presidential thinking about the relationship between church and state--from a traditional view based on separation to a new perspective characterized by collaboration. The new relationship might be defined by what students of the law would calla "zone of aecommodation," of what approving politicians would call government action for the "common good," or what some political scientists would calla type of "prophetic politics."ll The president's commitment to his faith-based initiative was based on five policy assumptions. First, he claimed that although compassion is the work of the government, ir is also a public issue that must be part of everyone's concern and business. Second, he maintained that it is possible for the government to encourage faith-based programs without changing the essential mission of the agencies involved. Third, the president contended that although government may eneourage different ways to change and save lives, eharities and community groups will never replace its obligation to serve those in need. Fourth, he claimed that government is able to treat faith-based groups equal to secular ones in their pursuit of charitable funds. And finally he held that faithbased and community groups will always have a place in the Bush White House to discuss welfare matters without fear of having policy solutions imposed on them. 1"2
Opponents from both the left and the right, however, increasingly criticized the president's actions on a variety of grounds. Ralph Neas, president of People for the American Way, claimed that Bush's new fhith-based plan had eonstitutional difficulties and that ir put "church and state on a direct collision course. ''1'3 Even some Bush supporters such as the Rev. Par Robertson of Regent University and the "700 Club," and Marvin Olasky, author of the book that influenced Bush,
The Tragedy of American Compas'sion, verbalized their fears. They argued that by accepting government financing, religious programs would invite government meddling into their mission and message. ~4 Other members of the Christian ttight argued that the president's proposals could provide tax dollars to Hare Krishna and Seientology social agencies. Jewish organizations were concemed that the Nation of Islam, an anti-Semitic organization, would receive government funds. The Southern Baptist Convention's North American Mission Board urged its lninistries to "proeeed with caution. ''15 Dr. James Dobson, spokesman for the evangelical organization, Focus on the Family, was cool to the notion. Fourteen liberal and moderate Baptist leaders issued a statement urging rejection of the initiative, and about 350 leaders with the Jewish Council for Public Affairs interrogated the new head of the White Itouse Office on Faith-Based Initiatives, John DiIulio, at a meeting in Washington, :6 Some congressional crities complained that the plan amounted to government funding of discrimination. Rep. Chet Edwards (D-Texas) said that he did not "want Bob Jones University to be able to take fbderal dollars for an alcohol treatment program and put out a sign that says no Catholics or Jews need apply here Ibr a federally funded job. ''ir His words seemed to portend such ibars. Indeed, it carne as no surprise to many policy opponents that the Salvation Army, a few months later, sought an exemption from local laws that would require ir to hire homosexuals. :s Nevertheless, in March 2001, the president's faith-based initiative reeeived legislative form through the introduction of H.B. 7, known as the "Community Solutions Act of 2001. '':9 J. C. Watts (R-Okla.) and Tony Hall (D-Ohio) introduced the bill with forty-four co-sponsors. It detailed and enlarged on several federal tax incentives fbr charitable giving and individual development accounts. First, Section 101 allowed taxpayers who do not itemize any of their deductions on their income tax form to: (a) be able to take the standard deduction fbr charitable contributions; and (b) to be able to itemize and deduct their charitable contributions as well. Second, Section 102 permitted withdrawals of funds from traditional and Roth IRA's for eha¡ distributions, while permitting them als() to be exempt from inclusion in the calculation of their taxable gross income. Third, Section 103 sanctioned an augmented deduction ibr charitable contributions of food inventory to the poor. Fourth, the bill allowed the establishment of Individual Development Accounts for eligible individu'als, 2o permitting them to receive a matching contribution of up to $500 per year from a qualified entity, such as a bank, a fbundation, or the federal, state or local government. The monies could be used for higher education, ~]rst time home buying, business capitalization, roll-overs, and death benefit pay-outs.
While the bill passed with significant support in the Housey its introduction in the Senate faltered and eventually died. Senators Rick Santorum (R-Pa.) and Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.) had reported optimistically in the spring of 2001 that they were "moving full steam ahead in drafting legislation, ''22 but a vafiety of problems began to emerge during the Senate hearings that gave Senator Lieberman seeond thoughts on the faith-based initiative.
First, the Salvation Army request to the White House to support a hiring exemption with regard to homosexuals, according to Lieberman, put "a cloud over the president's intention to expand a faith-based initiative. ''23 Indeed, he thought ir "might terminally wound [the bi]l] in congress," especially because it was also a "kind of ah end run" around the lawmakers. -~ Second, Democrats in both the House and the Senate were split on the bill. Some legislative eonstituencies such as the Congressional Black Caucus, and vocal congressmen like Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass.) attacked the bill on its discriminato~ T possibilities. The American Association of University Women also brought pressure to bear on the legislators. Certain religious groups continued to oppose it as well, particularly the United Methodists and the Baptist Joint Committee. Taking all this into consideration, Lieberman decided to decline to co-sponsor the charitable choice section of the legislation, claiming that it was unconstitutional. Senate Majority Leader Toro Daschle (D-S.D.) also made ir clear that he would not even place the bill on his agenda in its forro during the last session of Congress.
20. This would apply to those who earned an adjusted gross ineome of 820,000 as individual tax filers, $40,000 for joint filers, and $25,000 for head of household filers. Finally, the senator from Connecticut maintained that the White House was not dealing with the legal problem, and that without a response on the matter, Lieberman contended that he would not move it forward. Instead, he asked the Government Accounting Office, the research arm of Congress, to study the possible effect of these programs on the First Amendment. Effectively stunting the movelnent of the bill, then, Senator Lieberman lei} the matter in limbo, with Senator Santoruln having to admit that "dais is a hot button issue ''z~ and that the entire matter would probably have to be revisited later. In July, Lieberman met with the president and decided that he would prefer to write his own version of a faith-based bill to be considered later.
In August, John Dilulio also resigned as head of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. Claiming that he was keeping his pledge to leave after six months in office, and taking care of his health and falnily responsibilities, bis departure, nonetheless, came at a time when the White House faced a major political battle: trying to save the president's "signature social issue. ''~6 Reportedly, Dilulio had difficulty coping with criticism from both the let} and the right as well as dealing with senior White House aides who "increasingly cut hito out of strategy sessions about how to win passage of the initiatives. ''2r
To summarize, a~}er a promising beginning, the White House Office for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives hada rocky first year. The office was "hindered by classic organization problems: shifting priorities, lack of autonomy ibr the director, the absence of internal White House coordination, and inflated expectations. ''2s In its haste to establish this new entity, the Bush administraª encountered unanticipared criticism from civil libertarians and even froln leaders of Religious Right groups. These criticisms prompted the Senate to delay action on the bill despite early passage by the House of Representatives. Finally, dae events of 11 September 2001 effectively placed President Bush's faith-based initiative on the back burner. The war on terrorista in Afghanistan clearly took precedence over domestic policy proposals. pointed James Towey, former Secretary of Health and tlehabilitative Services for the State of Florida, an advocate for the aging, and the man who worked as legal eounsel for Mother Teresa's ministry fbr twelve years, as the new director of the Office of Faith-Based and Comlnunity Initiatives. 29, The president also announced an agreement with Senators Lieberman (D-Conn.) and Santorum (t/-Pa.) on a revised bill to provide federal money to religious charities and other nonprofit organizations. The new bill, the Charity Aid, Recovery and Empowerment Act, proposes new tax breaks to encourage charitable giving and includes extra money fora social services grant program. But the bill eliminates the most contentious element of Bush's original proposal, the "eharitable choice" provision allowing religious groups to favor members of their own faith in hiring. The bill thus represents a significant compromise on what had been a central proposal of Bush's "compassionate conservative" presidential campaign. 3o
The new bill was introduced in the Senate in February 2002. Ir passed, it must then be reconciled with the House measure passed in July 2001. However, despite President Bush's endorsement of the Senate proposal, confbrence negotiations between the Senate and the House remain difficult because the House rneasure contains the original charitable choice provisions that would permit hiring discrimination and would subsidize religion. Because of this difficulty, Senator Santorum suggested that House Republicans postpone discussion of the controversial "charitable choice'" proposals unfil Congress renews the 1996 welfare reform law later in the 2002 legislative session, a~
In addition to deleting the charitable ehoice provisions in the Senate measure, the context and purpose of" the White House's original faith-based initiative have changed. The Senate proposal is declared to be an emergency measure in response to the events of 11 September and the recession. Senator Lieberman has described it as an effbrt to meet human needs resulting from those events. Since government cannot meet 'al] those needs, the bill empowers a whole range of charitable organizations, including faith-based groups, to provide social services. 32 Moreover, the White House has recast its faith-based initiative to emphasize volunteer service. The new director of the White House office of Community and Faith-Based Initiatives, James Towey, is under the Thus, the president's original faith-based initiative has changed signifieantly. It has moq)hed flora ah emphasis upon eharitable choice and federal funding of religious groups into a tax-deduetion bill promoting charitable giving to religious and other non-profit groups in the wake of the 11 September attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
TIIE CATHOLIC I:{ESPONSE: THE BIstloPs AND TIIE HIERAllCIIY
During the entire national debate about President Bush's faithbased initiative, he received support from one significant religious constituency: the American Catholic bishops. Presiding over 60 million adherents, the largest religious minority in the United States, the members of the Catholie Chureh's hierarehy are the ones who ibrmulate and implement publie poliey, setting priorities for other chureh agencies, such as Catholic Cha¡ the Catholie Education Association, and the Catholie tlospital Assoeiation.
The term "Catholic" as it is used here, therefbre, specifically applies to that part of the institutional church that is directly involved in the administration, flmding, and provision of chmitable and social progratas, rather than being aeeountable to those individuals in the pew who support or oppose them. This is beeause the Catholie Chureh is a hierarehical, canonical organization, managed by a visible, authoritative leadership; and operated by specifie ageneies aeeountable to them. In contrast, the attitudes of its laity are diverse, its membership fluid, and their opinions diffieult to measure at any given time. just as important, if ehureh adherents opposed the faith-based initiative of President Bush, it would be hard for them to oppose either the policy of the ehureh leadership or the actions of its charitable ageneies. Thus, the term "Catholie" really defines the responses of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), :~4 whieh sets publie poliey for the Catholic Church in America. In this case, it also neeessa~ily includes the aetions of the church's main social and charitable providers, particularly, Catholic Charities USA.
Why then have the bishops, praetieally alone, supported the president when so many other religious, politieal, and eharitable groups have eritieized the president's faith-based initiative? John Carr, director of the Department of Social Development and World Peace for the 33. Milbank, "Chafity Bill Compromise Is Reached," Al. 34. Recently, the National Conference of Catholie Bishops, a canonical organization, and the United States Catholic Conferenee, its administrative arre, have become one agency, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.
USCCB, tried to explain it simply by saying: "We think it has the right purpose.., the right tone... " Moreover, Carr stated that he is "impressed with the leaders of this effort. ''35 But in reality, the answer is far more complex.
Ir lies partly in the traditional Catholic understanding of the pufpose of church-state relations. The Catho]ic understanding of church and state has always been predicated on the need to assure the freedoro of the church to can T out its sacred mission, that is, to teach, preach, and sanctity its adherents. And, by extension, the Catholic hierarchy's response to charitable choice, the Community Solutions Act (H. R. 7), and most aspects of the Bush faith-based initiative could, therefbre, have be› expected to be positive. This is because the charitable enactments and the president's policies, in the bishops' minds, have the potential to serve as opportunities to advance the church's broader mission to the poor, the sick, the homeless, and the marginalized in society.
In 1995, in anticipation of the national debate about welihre ret%rm, the bishops issued a statement entitled "Moral Principles and Policy Priorities }br Welfare Reform" in which they outlined the claurch's criteria ibr such change. Any such legislation, to them, would have to include ways to protect human life and dignity, to strengthen fhmily liIb, to encourage and provide rewards for work, to preserve a saibty net ibr the vulnerable, to build public/private partnerships to overcome poverty, and to invest in human dignity. 36 In 1996, as the debate about welfare refbrm intensified, the USCCB and Catholic Charities used these principles to criticize the general thrust and specific provisions of the bill vigorously. They lobbied against various provisions of the legislation: abolishing the entitlement, i~amily caps, restrictions on beneflts for legal immigrants, punitive time limits and work requirements, and cuts in the [bod stainp program. Although they managed to modify some provisions of the bill, their overall efforts were unsuccessful. In August 1996, President Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, thus ending welfare as we knew ir. 37 How can we explain the change in the bishops' attitude from criticism of the 1996 welfare reform law to support of President Bush's faith-based initiative? Several factors led the USCCB to view charitable choice more favorably. First, the bishops and many others noted the apparent success of the 1.996 reibrm law in dramatically reducing the rolls of we]~~are recipients. From 1996 to 2001, caseloads nationwide dropped by hall and poverty rates declined as well. Second, the efforts of the Republican National Committee to cultivate Catholic voters during the 2000 presidential election may have disposed church leaders to be more receptive to the new initiatives of President Bush. Likewise, the transition from the Clinton administration to the Bush presidency renewed the hopes of some bishops that preferred legislation, such as stricter anti-abortion laws and school vouchers, might be enacted by the new Republican administration. Third, the geographic importance of the Catholic vote in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections and the fact that Bush lost that vote nationally in the 2000 election are factors that have led the Bush administration to be especially solicitous of Catholic church leaders. In particular, Bush advisers recognize that the success of the faith-based initiative depends upon partnering with Catholic agencies that provide a vast array of social services nationwide. These factors help to explain in part why the American bishops were more receptive to the Bush administration's chal-itable choice proposals than to the 1996 welfare reform legislation.
Personal relationships also played a tole in the hierarchy's support for the Bush f~¨ initiative. On 26 Januaff 2001 (less than a weel< after bis inauguration), President and Mrs. Bush were invited and attended a dinner at the home of Washington's Cardimd-designate, Theodore McCarrick--a first. Retired Cardinal James Hickey, papal nuncio Archbishop Gabriel Montalvo, and Bishop William Lori, Bishop of Bridgeport, were ~dso present. The purpose of the Chilean sea bass dinner was to get acquainted, and from the president's perspective, it could also serve as an opportunity ~br outreach to the major religious leaders of a constituency that had not supported bis election. This was particularly important to the new president in light of bis campaign gaff visiting Bob Jones University and inadvertently appearing to support the anti-Catholic stance of many of the members of its faculty. Although his actions subsequently resulted in an apology to John Cardinal O'Connor, Bush still found that many Catholics were less than enthusiastic about his election. Mending Catholic f~nces was in order. Dinner with the new cardinal was a good plaee to start.
McCarrick was a close confidant of the pope; he was active in the bishops' national organization, and he had many contacts with those in its highest circles. He was politically well connected, too, having been appointed to the U. S. Commission on International Religious Freedoro by President Clinton in 1998 and subsequently sent by hito to assess religious freedom in China. McCarfick als() had ties to the Jewish community, a result of his assoeiation with the Appeal of Conseienee Foundation, led by Rabbi Arthur Sehneir, with whom the cardinal traveled to Russia, Rum~nia, China, and the Balkans.
MeCarfick, then, had the potential to be ah important ally on the faith-based initiative, and initially he artieulated a position of" positive, albeit limited, support: Done properly and with respeet for our traditions of" pluralism, this is an opportunit-v to further civil soeiety, and [to] reeognize the irnportanee of religion in any so› order. However, fait:h-based programs, with their indispensable roles, must not just be another way to privatize publie obligations, ah excuse for the governrnent to abandon its own responsibilities to the poor. 3s
Moreover, he observed the elevation of" public discourse brought about by the administration's initiative:
There is ah inereased interest in the tole of relig[ion] in solving our nation's and the world's problems .... Whatever one thinks about the wisdom of revising the relationshil) between govermnent and religious programs, we should be eneouraged that this eountry may be rediseovering the role of faith eominunities in dealiffg with some of the most intraetable problems of soeiety. 39
The results of the MeCarriek dinner were quickly observed. Within four days of the social event, Karl Rove, the president's ehief of staff, eontaeted Deal W. Hudson, ah influential C~th•194 friend and editor of Crisis magazine, to eonvene a eritieal meeting. Ir was to inelude the ehief exeeutive, Steven Goldsmith, ehairman of" a national advisory board on faith-based initiatives, and John j. DiIulio, its new head, along with thirty Catholie leaders at the White House. Ostensibly to discuss the importanee of" faith-based social serviees, this gathering afforded George W. Bush the opportunity to interact with a eross seetion of Catholie leaders, inchlding administrators who managed sehools, hospitals, nursing bornes, day-care faeilities, orphanages, dmg rehabilitation eenters, AIDS clinies, disaster relief services, and hospices. Partiei- pants were quick to see its purpose, with Hudson commenting, "The president and his advisers knew very well that for their faith-based program to work it must establish a full partnership with existing Catholie social serviee providers. This meeting is the beginning of that partnership.'40
It eou]d be seen in the reaetion of one of the attendees, Rev. Charles J. Chaput, O. F. M., arehbishop of Denver, who went baek to his dioeese with ah optimistie attitude. He praised the president for his "sineerity" and his "grasp of the issues." Chaput viewed the meeting with the presidentas a "positive beginning. ''4~ Stressing selMee as part of Catholie identity, Chaput saw the faith-based initiative asa way to solve eommon problems that required both government and eharitable responses. He voieed solne eoneerns and noted that they needed to be explored. However, the arehbishop was quiek to say that he was impressed that the presŸ "had the eourage to raise these issues in a new and hopeful way." Moreover, the president's meeting established "a good reason for eonfidenee," that "we should give the president's ereative programs a hearing and hope for their sueeess. ''49
The very next day, on 31 January, the president reinforeed his attempts to forge eloser relations with Catholies by inviting the leadership of Catholie Charities to the White House. He diseussed the reform of the tax eode and floated the idea that non-itemizers should be allowed to deduet eharitable gMng from their taxable ineomes. While this was all part of bis future agenda, it was beeoming even elearer that Bush wanted to build bridges to the ageney, and in turn, to the Catholie eonstitueney. He eommented that "our mission in the White Itouse is to say we we]eome you, we weleome your love, we weleome your finanees, we weleome your eompassion. ''4'3 tlelations between the Catholie leadership and the Bush administration began to grow eloser. On 12 February, ttoger Cardinal Mahoney, ehairman of the Domestie Poliey Committee of the United States Catholie Conferenee, spoke favorably about the president's plan on t:aith-based and eommunity initiatives:
The United States Catholie Conf~renee weleomes President Bush's priority on overeoming poverty as he begins to lead our nation .... Our bishops' eonferenee also weleomes bis initiative to reeognize and assist the role of "faith-based and comlnunity groups" in the struggle against poverty in our land. We look forward to a filller dialogue on the specifics of this initiative. We will seek opportunities to share our experience, concerns and hopes in ah effort to help the Administration create a workable program. 44 Cardinal Malaoney admitted that the church was concerned about excessive government regulation, maintaining the dignity of those in need, preserving the church's ethical and religious integrity, insuring the prophetic role of religious institutions, and respecting the responsibilities and limitations of both. But he seemed to brush these concerns aside as he asserted that the church was "encouraged ''4'5 by the tone of the inaugural address, the president's public statements, and his meetings with Catholic and other leaders. Mahoney summed up the church's interpretation of the f~¨ program by saying that "this initiative is about holding up COlnmunity, not teafing down government," and that it recognizes pluralism and takes "seriously the concerns and fears of those who had doubts about stronger ties between religious groups and the federal governlnent. ''4~ He concluded by saying that the bishops were encouraged by the individuals that the president appointed to the initiative, that his administration was addressing one of the most fhndamental problems of American society, and that the hierarchy welcomed a just public policy toward those in need. 47
In the spring, as support for the faith-based initiative continued to wane among many other religious constituencies, the president accepted ah invitation to deliver the commencement address to the Class of 2001 at the University of Notre Dame. Using the platform of the most prestigious Catholic university in America, Mr. Bush attempted to tie bis political ideology and religious beliefs on compassion to Catholic social teachings and those of Ibrmer President L)aadon Johnson. Emphasizing "God's special concern for the poor,'" he called fora "third stage" in the War on Poverty, chal]enging the graduates to practiee caring, kindness, and courtesy, rather than simply working to provide benefits to the needy.
President Bush explained his White House Oft]ce of Faith-Based and Colnmunit T Initiatives to much applause, and unvei[ed four new proposals. They included a "compassion capital fund" that would match private giving with federal dollars; a way for all taxpayers, even nonitemizers, to deduct charitab]e contfibutions; a three-fold increase in funding for homeownership; and a $1.6 billion plan to provide new 44 funds for drug treatment. Most relevant to his faith-based initiative and, in turn, to Catholic social and charitable organizations, was the fact that all these funds, and the president stressed "all of them," would be "opened to equal competition froln faith-based and community groups. ''4s
On 13 June 2001, the U. S. Catholic bishops endorsed the legislation of tlepresentatives Watts and ttall to implement President Bush's fhith-based, and as of that time, community initiatives as well. The hierarchy urged a "greater investment of public and private resources in overcoming poverty" and sent a letter to the bill's sponsors expressing their support for H. tl. 7. 49
The rationale for the official church endorselnent of the bill was due to its "focus on overcoming poverty, and its affirmation of the complementary roles and responsibilities of religious groups, communit), organizations and government. ''~~ Cardinal Mahoney called the proposal a "new asset [s] in addressing the most difficult problems in our neighborhoods and communities .... ,,5~ At the same time, he claimed that the political battles over ir were "polarized and ideological, ~bcused more on old battles of church-state issues and attempts to gain partisan advantage than on new opportunities to reach out to help those pushed to the sidelines of our national economic life, rather than on the need "to increase fbderal resources. ''52 Both he and the bishops supported the "Compassion Capital Fund. ''Sa The letter particularly supported sections 101 and 102 of H. ti. 7 and viewed the entire proposal asa "positive and needed recognition of the pluralism of American religious life .... ,,. 54 On 26 July 2001, the bishops applauded House passage of H. 1~. 7 and urged the Senate "to look beyond partisan politics in its work on companion legislation. '''~5 Even though the House passed the bill without the "compassion fund" provision, the bishops accepted such a trade-off and the realities of politics. In a statement to the press, the hierarehy continued to acknowledge its support of the bill's provisions, reeognizing it asa new tool to help those working to overcome poverty and address the problems of neighborhoods. And, they reiterated the USCCB rationale claiming that the Initiative recognizes that religious groups can be effective partners with government and community organizations in providing social services, ~~4thout jeopardizing their identity and integrity or undermining the rights and dignity of those in need. It is atso important to aeknowledge that the work of faith-based and eommunity groups~, though important, cannot substitute for. j'ust public policy and the responsibilities of the larger soeiety, ineluding the federal government. The}, cannot replaee needed government aetion to address the more than 40 million Amerieans without health care .... 56
ANOTtIER CATHOLIC RESPONSE: CATHOLIC CHARITIES Catholic Charities was founded in 1910 to instill a sense of solidarity among Catholic social service providers, and to establish a network for the various charities that they administered. It enjoyed a unique position among American charitable and social service organizations throughout its history. Catholie work with the poor, dependent children, prisoners, elderly, the sick and the disabled had begun as early as 1727, when Ursuline nuns took in orphans in the eolonies. During the nineteenth century, Sister Elizabeth Seton founded a religious order, the Sisters of Charity, and established many ehild-care facilities and homes for the aged. In World War II, Catholie Cha5ties emerged as a signifieant source for humanitarian aid. It distributed financial and other services in Europe through its global infrastructure of social agencies, and during that time, received support froln the U. S. government fbr shipping costs and the portage of its re]ief goods. 57 Because Catholic Charities was already on the ground in Europe, it could provide help even before the fledging United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) could do so. Thus, it could also fhnnel humanitarian aid to "Catholic" eountries like Germany and Italy in the wake of Ameriean, anti-Axis sentiment.
By the early 1970s, Catholic Charities, a 501(c)3 tax-exempt agency, began to accept an ever growing number of government eontracts. In return, it had to redefine its mission in essentially secular terms, broadening its purpose to become an institution that provides services to people in need and advanees justice. Purists felt that this created an inappropriate dependence of a Catholic organization on government. They saw it as "fraught with peril," anda situation that would cause a shift in the mission of the agency from one based on the corporal works of mercy to one committed to improving societal systems though policy development, legislative analysis, and colnmunity mobilization. In short, some Catholics felt that the leadership of Catholic Charities, of necessity, would becolne more concerned with lobbying and advocating ibr specific welfare programs than in doing Jesus' work of service to the poor. 5s
The most current statistics show that each year, more than 9.5 million people in need turn to one of 1,400 local Catholic chafities fora variety of social services. With a paid staff of over 50,000 people, and volunteers and board members that number over 200,000, the agency spent over $2.2 billion in 1999 to provide social services in the United States, 59 most of which carne from government sources and contracts. Not surprisingly, 53 percent of Catholic chafities' revenues calne from state and local govemment, and 9 percent carne froln the federal government. Only 12 percent calne from church and community support, and 7 percent from other sources. 6o
Prior to the Bush faith-based initiative, Catholic Charities was already receiving the bulk of its operating funds from public coffers, and had not experienced any real barriers to its operation. Thus, ir approached the Bush faith-based initiative with "cautious optimista. TM The Reverend Fred Kammer, S. J., president of Catholic Charities USA, spoke for the agency when he said that he applauded Mr. Bush's efforts to simplify bureaucratic requirements, to avoid polemics, and to establish a level pla~ng field for religiously inspired and other service providers. 62 But, at the same time, he called on the government to protect his and other agencies from extremists on the political leŸ and right, as well as to be certain that agencies that would be eligible for federal fimds in the future be both mission-driven and COlnpetent. ~3
Initially, one might have expected that Catholic Chafities wou]d fear a potential loss of government revenues asa result of possible competition from other re]igious, charitable, and socM agencies. But this did not seem to be the case. The agency's early coneerns, instead, were centered on how the faith-based initiative would work, what type of aeereditation standards would be applied to social and eharitable providers, and whether or not additional funds would be available. ~~4 Early meetings with members of the White House staff clarified these questions. And when the leadership of Catholie Charities found that there would ostensibly be no new money for charitable services, the ageney deeided to take no position on the president's approaeh to faithbased initi•tives sinee their long-standing contraets were seeure. This is significant beeause Catholic Charities also foeuses on "legislative advoeaey and poliey analysis in the areas of welfare, affordable housing and ehild and health eare. ''65 As an independent, non-partisan ageney, ir ehose not to take an offieial position on eharitable ehoiee or the Watts-Hall bill, H. R. 7, in order to work on other legislation that ir eonsidered more relevant to its mission. Catholie Charities deeided to let the bishops take the lead on this matter. Asa result, the ageney felt no eompunetion about jumping into the po]itical fray a few weeks later, in February 2001, to join with twenty-five other faith-based organizations and eall on the Bush administration to restore benefits to legal immigrants that had been eliminated. These included partieipation in the Food Stamp, Medieaid, and State Children's Health Insuranee programs. 6~ THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND CATHOLICS Why do the bishops, then, repeatedly support President Bush and his faith-based initiatives when so lnany other religious, politieal, and charitable groups have criticized them? And why does the Bush administration continue to seek support from the Catholic hierarchy ibr these policies? The explanation ~br this ~flmost symbiotic relationship lies largely in the politieal context of the 2000 presidential election. For the Catholic bishops, it centers on the hopes and expectations of chureh leaders that a Republican White House will champion policies they favor. For the Bush administration, it revolves around the election imperative and the importante of cultivating the Catholic vote for the Ihture.
From the bishops' perspective, the White House's faith-based initiative could address some of their potential needs and institutional con-64. Ibid. 65. "'tIead of Divinity Sehool Hehir to Retire: Father J. Bryan Hehir to Assume Presideney of Catholie Charities USA," 13 June 2001; available online ti'oro http: //www.news. harvard.edu/gazette/2001/06.14/04-hehir.html. 66. Press release, "Twenty Five Faith-Based Organizations Call on President to Restore Benefits to Legal Immigrants," 8 February "2001. cerns. As episcopal administrators of large dioceses with multiple social serviees and programs, they stand to benefit from the Bush initiative--provided there is expanded govermnent funding. Catholic hospitals and social selwice agencies need support and financial assistance. As policymakers within their own church, the bishops support the Bush ~~ith-based initiative because they want to position themselves strategically to benefit flora it in the long term.
The bishops also had high expectations of poliey synchronieity between the Bush administration and the Catholie Chureh on several major issues. With Bush in the White House, the chances of reeeiving favorable action on restrieting abortion--a signature issue for the bishops--are perceived to be much greater than they would have been if Democratie candidate Al Gore had been eleeted president. The Bush administration has also supported sehool vouchers--another issue of keen interest and financial importanee to ehurch leaders. Sueh issue compatibility means that the bishops have strong incentives to support President Bush's programs en bloc, in hopes that he will retm'n the fhvor and support measures important to the Catholic Chureh.
Sueh quid-pro-quo reasoning ,,vas evident during the 2000 eleetion campaign in the deeisions of Cardinal Edward Egan of New York, Cardin'al Anthony Bevilacqua of Philadelphia, and Cardinal Bernard Law of Boston to appear with eandidate Bush on the campaign circuit. They also wrote pastoral letters to parishioners urging support of" pro-life candidates on E]ection Day. 6r No less important a factor in the relations between President Bush and Catholic Chureh leaders is politic~d necessity. The Bush administration had, and continues to have, good reason to eultivate Catholie voters and build good relations with the Catholic hierarehy. The concentration of Catholics in large "swing" states with many electoral votes (New York, California, Texas, Florida, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Miehigan, Ohio, and New Jersey) is a politieal reality few national politicians can afford to ignore.
In the 9,000 eampaign, the Repub]ican National Committee established a Catholic Task Foree to wean Catholics away fi'om the Demoerario Party. The GOP Catholie Task Foree had some sueeess, although nationally, Catholies voted for Gore by a margin of 50 pereent to 47 pereent (with 2 percent for Nader and 1 percent for Buehanan). ~s Bush politieal advisers want to eontinue efforts to appeal to Catholics with polieies such as the faith-based initiative, rest¡ on abortion The bishops' support of President Bush's faith-based initiative, then, must be situated in this political context, that is, asa positive charitable, social engagement by which both the White House and the USCCB each stand to advance their own future political agendas. The White House and the Iiepublican Party are looking towards winning major national and state elections, while the bishops envision the potential of having a ffiend in the White House and supporters in other significant positions of power. The Catholic hierarchy foresees worldng with a president who is pro-life, who will appoint pro-life justices to fbderal eourts, who will support school vouchers and the funding of parochial schools as well as advance the accommodation of religious groups in matters of federal funding of social services. THE FUTURE In light of the difficulties in the American economy and national security, the stalled interest in H. ti. 7, and the radically altered priorities of the Bush White House since 11 September, what might be expeeted with regard to Catholic efforts on behalf of the waning faithbased initiative?
First, the Catholic bishops will be able to continue to react positively only if the Bush White House and the congressional constituency ibr faith-based initiatives maintain their efforts to implement the social/ charitable policies. Now that President Bush and Senators Lieberman 
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and Santorum have agreed upon a compromise measure to provide fbderal funds to religious charities and other non-profit organizations, it is expected that the bishops will support the revised bill. Moreover, Catholic Charities U.S.A., which took no position on the original proposal and the House measure, backed the Senate compromise. In a letter to President Bush, the Rey. J. Bryan Hehir, the new president of Catholic Charities U.S.A., welcomed two key provisions in the Charity Aid, Recovery and Empowerment Act of" 2002 (CABE): 72 The bill x~411 help spur additional giving to charities by allowing non-itemizers to claim charitable deductions on their taxes, thereby making the tax code fairer for the majoritv of these individuals and families, manv of whom ate members of lowincomc ho¨
The legislation also will pro~de additional, guaranteed funding tbr the Social Services Block Grant without corresponding reductions to other criticial programs that serve the poor. 73 As mentioned earlier, the Charity Aid, Recovery and Empowerment Act, worked out by President Bush with Senators Lieberman and Santorum, must flrst be passed by the Senate and then be reconciled in conference with the House measure passed in July 2001. These House-Senate negotiations could be difficult since the Senate version omits the original charitable choice provisions contained in the House measure that would permit hiring discrimination based on religion and that would allow the direct subsidization of religion. However, the fact that President Bush agreed to the Senate measure may be enough to persuade House conferees to go along with the Senate version.
This means that the controversy over charitable choice will be postponed until Congress is able to debate renewal of the 1996 welfare reform law in light of escalating security priorities; however, this may take longer than expected. Catholic Charities USA will undoubtedly continue its advocacy for the poor--working for bilis that increase unemploylnent insurance benefits and that provide income tax rebates for low-income households. According to Sharon Daly, the vice president for Social Policy of Catholic Chalities, in testimony befbre the Senate in early October 2001, Catholic Charities will focus its lobbying efforts on S. 685, "The Strengthening Working Families Act," and S. 1503, "Promoting Sale and Stable Families Amendments Act of 2001. TM It will also lobby for universal health insurance coverage, the restoration of Medicaid, SCHIP and food stamps for legal immigrants, and a repeal of a portion of the tax cut fbr upper-income Americans.
Thus, in the end, ir is possib]e to conclude that the "Catholic" response to the watered-down version of the Bush faith-based initiative will continue to be positive. Catholic Charities USA can gire qualified support so long as ir retains the freedom to continue lobbying for the needy. As for the USCCB, the bishops see ir as an opportunity to affect the formulation of policy, to guide the principles of the government with regard to the poor, anda new way to carry out their mission to the marginalized in society.
Catholic bishops hope to maintain and enlarge the freedom of the church to carry out its salvific and social responsibility by altering the relationship between church and state, thereby possibly bringing about a partnership with the government on educational, social, and charitable ser, alces. President Bush's faith-based initiative has been instrumental in cementing ties between the Bush administration and the Catholic hierarchy. While the Bush administration anticipates winning Catholic votes in future elections, the bishops look forward to the institutionalization of major change with regard to a more favorable churchstate relationship in American society. Indeed, both groups seek to get the best part of the faith-based bargain, and on their own terms. 74 . Testimony of Sharon Daly before the Senate Finance Subcommittee on Social Security and Family Policy made available by Catholic Charities USA. Related to S.685, Catholic Charities would support responsible fatherhood, appropriate child support, and expansion of earned income tax credits for larger families, restoration of social service block grants, employer sponsored child care, and increased child welfare. With regard to S.1530, ir would support adoption assistance payments for children adopted through non-profit agencies.
